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MARRIED WOMEN - BEYOND THE PALE
OF THE LAW OF RAPE'
Christine Boyle*
The author discusses the law relating to marital rape and con-
tributes to the debate about law reform in this area, with some
reference to proposed amendments to The Criminal Code. At the
time of writing these were embodied in Bill C-53 which had
received its First reading in Parliament on January 12, 1981. The
main argument is that law reform in this area should display
sensitivity to the special coercive potential of the marital
relationship and that any pressure, including the conscious
exploitation of external factors, to engage in sexual activity
comes within the appropriate sphere of the criminal law.
Les femmes mari6es - au-dela des limites de
la loi du vio
L 'auteur discute la loisur le viol conjugal et contribue au ddbat
sur la rforme dans ce domaine, avec renvoi aux amendements
proposes du Code penal. Au moment de rdaction, ces derniers
faisaient partie de l'Article C-53, passO en premiare lecture au
Parlement le 2 janvier, 1981. La thase principale est que la
r~forme de la loi dans ce domaine doit 6tre sensible d une
possibilitJ de contrainte particuliere dans la relation conjugale et
que tout exercice depression, y compriS l'exploitation consciente
defacteurs ext rieurs, pour forcer un rapport sexuel entre dans le
domaine approprit4 du droit pdnal.
There has been a flurry of interest in the subject of marital
rape. in recent years, so that the arguments relating to the
abolition of the husband's immunity from the criminal
sanction for rape have been extensively aired.2 Indeed there has
also been a degree of political interest in the subject
culminating in January, 1981 in Bill C-53, which contains, inter
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Windsor
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "pale" means, inter alia, a
district of territory within determined bounds or subject to a particular
jurisdiction, e.g. the pale of English law. The word is used to indicate that
part of Ireland, varying in extent, but centred on Dublin, over which
English jurisdiction was established. "Beyond the pale", the protection of
English law could not be guaranteed.
2 See e.g., Peter English, "The Husband Who Rapes His Wife" (1976), 126
New L.J. 1223; Jocelynne A. Scutt, "Consent in Rape: The Problem of the
Marriage Contract" (1977), 3 Monash U.L.R. 225; Note (1977), 52
N. Y.U.L.Rev. 306; "Comment" (1978), 82 Dick. L.R. 608; Gilbert Geis,
(1981), 1 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
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alia, a provision abolishing the husband's immunity.' The
purpose of this essay is to utilize discussion of this form of
domestic violence as an area in which to offer some thoughts on
such matters as the development of the law in relation to
women, the severe limits on the effective and appropriate use of
the criminal sanction, and law reform. The main thesis is that
reform which does not display sensitivity to the special coercive
potential of marriage is unsatisfactory and that abolition of the
immunity, without more, may have little real impact.
It is important to stress at the outset the limits on this essay:
it is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of the whole
of the law appertaining to domestic sexual assault. Although
there is a great deal which can be said about domestic violence,
my topic concerns the question of access of a married woman to
the criminal courts with a complaint of rape by her husband."
Such access could be prevented in any legal system by a number
of factors:
(1) The attitude of the woman' herself - she may not
categorize a specific act of intercourse as rape;
(2) The screening activities of law enforcement officials; and
(3) The substantive law - the criminal law may not
adequately or at all categorize some acts of coercive
sexual intercourse as rape.
These factors are all relevant to a discussion of the Canadian
position. Law reformers have tended so far to concentrate, in
the context of rape laws generally, on enforcement difficulties
and in this specific context, on the removal of the husband's
immunity.6
The above point is made in order to stress that in this writer's
view, access issues are not procedural only. In a journal of this
"Rape in Marriage: Law and Law Reform in England, the United States
and Sweden" (1978), 6Ad. L.R. 284; Charlotte L. Mitra, ". . . For She Has
No Right or Power To Refuse Her Consent", [1979] Crim L.R. 558; Sandra
L. Schultz, "The Marital Exception to Rape: Past, Present and Future",
[1978] Del. Col. of L.R. 261; Arthur F. Schiff, "State of Oregon v. Rideout
- Can Husband Rape Wife?" (1979), 26 Med. Tr. T.Q. 49; George Jonas,
"Rape and Marriage Are Not Like Horse and Carriage" (1979), 3 Can.
Lawyer 10 (April). For a useful judicial comment, see State v. Smith, 148
N.J. Super. 219, 372 A. 2d 386 (1977).
Bill C-53, First Sess., 32nd Parl.(Can.), 29 Eliz. II, 1980-81 also contains
provisions replacing rape with sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault
offences and relating to the exploitation of children.
4 See The Criminal Code R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 143.
The words "woman" and "wife" etc. are throughout used generically
unless the context otherwise indicates.
6 See the Canada Law Reform Commission's Working Paper 22 Criminal
Law: Sexual Offences (Ottawa: The Commission, 1978) and the Report on
Sexual Offences (Ottawa: Min. of Supply & Services, 1978). The latter
recommended the total abolition of the immunity, at 16-17.
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nature it is legitimate to include discussion of substantive law
which unjustifiably excludes one group from the scope of any
particular rule.7 It also seems necessary to stress that the
limitations imposed on this paper are not based on any notion
that domestic rape is essentially a criminal law matter. There
would probably be general agreement that there has been a
trend away from the use of the criminal sanction' caused by a
number of factors such as the pragmatism and
humanitarianism which support diversion from the criminal
justice system as well as the provision of support services and
social programmes rather than punishment. It would be
simplistic in the extreme simply to urge expansion of the
criminal law as if that were the only possible response to
marital rape. That is not to say that discussion of the use of the
criminal sanction is without merit, simply that it must be
understood as one aspect of a much wider subject.At apractical
level it is true to say that what abused wives (whatever form the
abuse takes) need is rapid practical and emotional help as
opposed to the mere chance of the ponderous punishment of
their spouses who are very likely to need help themselves,
although the two are naturally not mutually exclusive.
Discussion of the criminal sanction in this context may be
useful for a number of reasons, apart from highlighting certain
commonplaces about the difficulties of enforcement in the
domestic sphere. It illustrates some very significant reasons for
7I would therefore categorize, for example, votes for women as an access
issue, but recognize the lack of agreement on precise scope of the concept of
access to justice. However, I am not suggesting simply that if I had my way,
the law of rape would be different, but that the substantive law has the same
effect and can be discussed in the same context as the refusal of a Crown
attorney to proceed with a rape complaint.
As, for example, in the context of homosexual conduct, abortion and the
increasing use of diversion programmes. Rape seems to be an exception as
far as this trend is concerned, reformers tending to express concern about
the under-, rather than the over-utilization of the criminal law of rape.
Thomas J. Lewis suggests that until "the latter part of the 1960's the
primary concern with the law of rape was its adequacy for protecting men
from unfounded and malicious charges" in "Recent Proposals in the
Criminal Law of Rape: Significant Reform or Semantic Change?" (1979),
17 Osg. HallL.J. 445. Evidence that this is still a significant concern can be
found in Forsythe v. R. (1980), 15 C.R. (3d) 280 (S.C.C.). However, rape is
only an apparent exception if the general theory is accepted that criminal
law should be reduced, or expanded, to its essential minimum and then
vigorously enforced. See the Report of the Canada Law Reform
Commission's Working Paper No. 10, The Limits of Criminal Law:
Obscenity, a Test Case (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975). This is
important for those feminists who are radicalized liberals, and find it goes
against the grain to advocate increased use of the criminal sanction. The
same liberal trap lies in wait for those concerned about pornography. For
discussions, see Colloquium, "Violent Pornography: Degradation of
Women Versus Right of Free Speech" (1978-79), 8 N. Y. U. Rev. of Law and
Social Change 181.
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denial of access such as the manipulation of the law for
political purposes by relatively powerful groups and the sheer
complexity of the concepts required to draw rational
boundaries to the criminal law. This paper concentrates on the
concepts of consent, submission and criminal responsibility.
It is necessary to outline the present law simply as
background to my more general discussion. On a theoretical
level in Canada, the law tells us that non-consensual intercourse
is so wrong as to warrant the use of the criminal sanction. 9
Rape is a crime carrying a maximum punishment of
imprisonment for life,' 0 a reflection of the seriousness of the
crime.
However, still at the level of theory - there is no need to
rehearse the divergence between the theory and the law in
practice here - The Criminal Code states that a husband
cannot be guilty of the rape of his wife: in other words, he has
an immunity, in Hohfeldian terms. He can have sexual
intercourse without her consent and not be guilty of rape
(though he may be charged with assault causing bodily harm, at
least if he hurts her).' 2  The legal position in other
Commonwealth countries varies slightly in the width of the
immunity.' 3
The marital exception flows from the husband's status as
such and proposed changes in the law come very late in the
movement from status to contract. It has its roots, in Canada
and common law countries generally, in English law, since Sir
Matthew Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown', made a bare
assertion that a wife gives a general consent to intercourse on
9 I am not asserting on any empirical level that there is a general commitment
to the wrongness of rape, but I am assuming that there is some level of
consensus that at least violent rape ought to be a serious crime. It is
fascinating to speculate as to why rape is a crime, but it is enough for the
purposes of this paper that it is criminal, with the marital exception.
'o The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s.144. Bill C-54, First Sess.,
32nd Parl (Can.), 29 Eliz. II, 1980-81. Clause 18, retains this maximum
punishment for aggravated sexual assault which entails the use of a
weapon, or the infliction of serious bodily harm.
"Id., s.143.
12Which would apparently undermine any argument about the
inappropriateness of the use of the criminal law in the home, except for
those who would argue its inappropriateness for any domestic crime. For
discussion and authorities on assault, see Christine Boyle, "Violence
Against Wives - The Criminal Law in Retreat?" (1980), 31 N.LL.Q. 35,
41-43.
" For the U.K. position, see Boyle, id. 37-44. For a comparative dis-
cussion see Gilbert Geis, supra note 2. For the American application of
the English common law rule, statutory modifications of that rule, and
analysis in terms of the purposes of the criminal law, see Sandra Schultz,
supra note 2.
,4 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, Vol. 1,
(London: Professional Books Ltd., 1971), 629.
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marriage, a consent which she is legally incapable of
retracting. I I
This dubious authority for the husband's immunity has been
cited ad nauseam by Commonwealth and American judges' 6
and never seems to have been seriously challenged judicially,' 7
although some slight inroads have since been made in England
to the effect that rape is possible after a decree nisi of divorce or
after judicial separation.' 8 The issue has not come before a
Canadian judge probably because the Code is clear that a
husband cannot rape his "wife", so that there is here no scope
for judicial tinkering with the limits of the immunity. It would
seem that the only possible argument (and it is at best labelled
tenuous) is that a separated wife is not a "wife" within the
meaning of section 143 of the Code. The inevitable response
would be the tradition of strict interpretation of penal
statutes. 11
The issue on a political level is as follows: will it perform any
legitimate public function to recognize, via the criminal law, a
wife's right to sexual self-determination? 20 In order to proceed,
,5 Sir Matthew Hale is an interesting historical figure. He was also
responsible for that other well-known comment that an allegation of rape is
easy to make, but difficult to prove and difficult to refute, id., 635. The
idea that false allegations of rape constitute a real danger has caused
enormous problems of enforcement in countries where the English
common law has been influential. Hale also presided, in the course of his
judicial career, over a number of witch trials. The idea that an allegation of
witchcraft might be easy to make and difficult to refute apparently did not
occur to him. See Gilbert Geis, "Lord Hale, Witches and Rape" (1978), 5
Brit. J of L. and Soc. 26, and Hugh V. McLachlan and J. K. Swales, "Lord
Hale, Witches and Rape; a Comment" (1978), 5 Brit. J. of L. and Soc. 251.
'
6 See e.g. State v. Smith, 148 N. J. Super 219, 372 A 2d. 386 (1977) and R. v.
Miller, [1954] 2 All E.R. 529 (Winchester Assizes).
'" Some doubts were expressed obiter in Clarence (1888), 22 Q.B.D. 23.
Wells, J. stated, at 33, that if intercourse with one's wife while suffering
from venereal disease were an assault "it must constitute rape, unless
indeed, as between married persons rape is impossible, a proposition to
which I am certainly not prepared to assent, and for which there seems to
me to be no sufficient authority."
18 That is, after a judge has withdrawn the wife's notional consent. See, R. v.
Clarke, [1949] 2 All E.R. 448 (Leeds Assizes); R. v. Miller, [1954] 2 All
E.R. 529 (Winchester Assizes); R. v. O'Brien, [19741 3 All E.R. 663
(Crown Ct.); R. v. Steele (1976), 65 Cr. App. R. 22 (C.A.). These cases are
discussed elsewhere. See, e.g. Boyle, supra note 12, at 40-41.
'9 See generally Elmer A. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1974), 153-54. He quotes Rose C. J. in Kelly v. O'Brien,
[1942] O.R. 691, 694. "The defendant is entitled to judgment if the Act is
ambiguous and if one reasonable meaning will let him out." It would
appear to be a difficult task even to establish the ambiguity of the word
"wife" except possibly in the context of an argument that it includes
common law wife.
20 It is of course a political question, as with all issues relating to the
defensible scope of the criminal law, whether a husband should have a right
1981
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I shall simply state the political assumption on which this paper
is based. I assume that since it is accepted that non-consensual
intercourse can legitimately be defined as criminal, the
distinction between wives and other rape victims is invidious
and a denial of the full humanity of a wife in a sexual context.
Such a distinction is based on the view of a wife as the property
of her husband, a view that I hope no one would now openly
defend, on the equally untenable view that a sexual relationship
in the past has some probative value in relation to the sexual
activity in question, 2 on the continuing doubt as to the veracity
of the rape victim, and on a misguided emphasis on the value of
marriage per se.
The view is apparently shared by all political parties in
Canada; abolition seems inevitable. 2 This is good in that it will
to his wife's sexual services, irrespective of her wishes, and the arguments
have already been aired. Norval Morris and A. L. Turner, "Two Problems
in the Law of Rape" (1952-55), 2 Univ. Queensland L.J. 247, attempt the
most comprehensive defence of the husband's immunity. John Cyril Smith
and Brian Hogan, in their celebrated text on Criminal Law 4th ed.,
(London: Butterworths, 1978) quote their views with approval, at 403. "If
the wife is adamant in her refusal the husband must choose between letting
the wife's will prevail, thus wrecking the marriage and acting without her
consent. It would be intolerable if he were to be conditioned in his course of
action by the threat of criminal proceedings" (emphasis added). The
defence seems to concentrate on such assumptions as - wives suffer less
than other rape victims; "laymen" don't label marital rape as rape;
possible prosecutions would jeopardize the institution of marriage. Most
writers, cited in note 2, attack the immunity.
This writer would like to offer one contribution to the debate about
whether the husband's immunity is justified. A point which may highlight
how curious the law is rendered by a distinction between rapists and
husband rapists. It has been generally held that a husband can aid and abet
the rape of his wife, (see, e.g. D.P.P. v. Morgan, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347
(H.L.)) yet even in cases where the husband had intercourse as well he is not
guilty of rape per se. One American case provides what may be an extreme
example. In State v. Drope, 462 S.W. 2d.677 (Mo.1971), the husband, in
co-operation with four other men, tied his wife to a bed and held a gun to
her head while each of the others had intercourse with her. He then had
intercourse with her himself, but this did not legally constitute rape. This
type of fact situation helps to shake stereotypical images of marital
"rape", and makes a mockery of the argument that to categorize non-
consensual marital intercourse as rape would jeopardize marriages. As with
rape in general we are dealing with a spectrum of widely-varying fact
situations, from the more-or-less "accidential" rape to the extremely
violent. One cannot categorize marital rape as falling automatically at any
point on that spectrum and then use an a priori classification to justify
refusal to utilize the criminal sanction.
, For a discussion and references to some of the writing on this subject see
Christine Boyle, "Section 142 of The Criminal Code - A Trojan Horse?"
(1981), 23 Cr.L.Q. 253.
22 It had already been abolished in Sweden in 1975 when the Criminal Code
was amended to state simply that a man may be liable for the rape of his
wife notwithstanding the marriage contract. Total abolition is not the only
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certainly do away with one of the more primitive rules of our
criminal law and the negative message that wives are in a
position of sexual subordination to their husbands. But what I
have said so far is merely background to my main concern
which relates to the nature of the 'justice' to which wives will
have gained access. This neglected issue raises questions
relating to feminist aspirations and the criminal law which I
hope at least to begin to explore. In other words, I believe it is
not sufficient to say, "the marital exception is outrageous and
outmoded and should be done away with". Some thought has
to be given to the law that fills the gap. Otherwise abolition is in
danger of being a superficial sop to feminist concern, the
thought always being possible that a husband could rarely be
convicted of rape anyway. The danger of a formal change
without substance is all too real in any event, but at least
change will be made on a more sophisticated level. The very
exercise of thinking about the nature of rape in the marital
context may be more helpful than the mere formal abolition of
the immunity, although that would at least constitute a clear
theoretical statement that sexual assault on one's wife is
appropriately labelled as criminal. Change in the law after all is
only a minimum requirement of real social change in those
areas where it has any impact at all. Concern about the impact
of the law is particularly acute in this context since there is an
apparent tension between the "public" nature of criminal law
and the supposedly "private" nature of the family. This is too
well-known to justify any great degree of discussion here.23
Nevertheless, the following are some observations on the
subject.
Firstly and most obviously, although that is not to diminish
the importance of this point, the criminal law cannot function
efficiently by itself; it needs to be administered by people.
There naturally has to be a commitment on the part of the
human agencies responsible for the enforcement of the criminal
justice system before the law, even in its own limited sense, can
possible reform. It may well be that difficulties of proof would preclude
conviction where the spouses are not separated, but the main argument
against such a compromise is one of principle, that the law should not
symbolically condone non-consensual intercourse in any context, nor
indicate that wives are in a position of sexual subordination to their
husbands.
23 A useful article about the impact of the law on domestic violence is Susan
Maidment, "The Law's Response to Marital Violence in England and the
U.S.A." (1977), 26 LC.L.Q. 403. There are a number of interdisciplinary
collections of essays. See, e.g. Marie Borland, ed., Violence in the Family
(Manchester: Manchester U. Press, 1976), J. P. Martin, ed., Violence and
the Family (Chichester, N.Y.: Wiley, 1978), Suzannek Steinmetz and
Murray A. Straus, eds., Violence in the Family (New York: Dodd, Mead &
Co., 1975), John M. Eekelaar and Sanford N. Katz, Family Violence: An
International and Interdisciplinary Study (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978).
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be said to be giving wives protection against sexual assault by
their husbands. There is considerable evidence of antagonism
towards rape victims from law enforcement officials,24
particularly where victims have had a previous sexual or even a
social relationship with their attackers. Accordingly, one does
not need to be a pessimist to predict that the law, as reformed,
will not effect significant change in a practical sense. The
attitude of law enforcers may in fact reflect a significant body
of public opinion to the effect that a husband does have a right
to sex. Consequently, the question we are considering here is
whether the criminal law can ever really work without some
consensus in its favour. This poses a problem for a feminist
analysis of the criminal law since there may be a significant
body of public opinion out of sympathy with rules which reflect
feminist aspirations: that is rules which are counter-productive
as far as the dominant male group is concerned. This is a
complicated subject which cannot be pursued here. I merely
question whether the criminal law can be looked to for the
furtherance of feminist aspirations if the consensus which
would render the law superfluous will be fatal to its
enforcement.25
Secondly, there are genuine practical difficulties in
prosecuting husbands for rape, perhaps slightly more than
those which have been well-documented in the context of
domestic assault generally: the lack of credence given the rape
victim; reluctance to report; the lack of support for the wife in
the community (although this has changed significantly in the
past few years); and the ambivalence of the victim towards the
husband because of love and shared experiences, including
children. Convictions have been extremely rare so that law
reformers have had to deal with the objection that
unenforceable laws should not be on the statute books.
24 See Lorenne M. G. Clark and Debra J. Lewis, Rape: The Price of Coercive
Sexuality (Toronto: Women's Press, 1977), c. 10, entitled "Victimology:
The Art of Victim Blaming".
25 Even if there were some sign of a positive public attitude to a change in the
law, subtle mechanisms exist for undermining this. Shortly after the
proposal to abolish the husband's immunity was announced, a cartoon
appeared in the Globe and Mail. It depicted a bemused-looking man in bed
while his wife denounced him to the police as the man who tried to rape
her. She was very fat and in curlers, so the message was clear. It is ludicrous
to think that such a woman could be the object of desire, thus indicating a
belief that rape is sexually motivated. It is also ludicrous to portray the
husband in the role of rapist as we all know that a rapist is a man who
jumps out of the bushes, not a friend, or a lover, or a husband, and finally
the whole idea is essentially trivial. I am not saying that anything is sacred
and should not be the subject of humour, but humour is revealing, and
there are still in evidence serious misconceptions about the nature of rape,
and a reluctance to accept that sexual assault can be just another form of
violence within marriage, and yet another very cruel way of conveying the
message that wives are not in control of their own lives.
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However, unenforceability is a problem which has to be tackled
in the context of sexual assault generally and does not justify
arbitrary exemptions. Such an argument, taken to its logical
conclusion, would justify repeal of rape laws across the board
since they are notoriously difficult to enforce. 26
A further limiting factor on the effectiveness of the criminal
sanction as well as other forms of legal intervention is the
expressed commitment to the preservation of the family, often
suspect in that it may be used as a convenient shield for a policy
really directed at the oppression of women. In other words, the
policy is actually aimed at denying freedom of choice to women
and preserving the traditional family structure no matter what
the cost to individual women.
Even if there were no ulterior political motive to the
expression of such a policy, one has to doubt whether it is
legitimate for the law to try to preserve marriages where
violence has taken place. In any event, it has not been shown
that failing to punish a husband for raping his wife will help to
preserve the marriage. It is submitted that at the very least the
law should adopt a neutral stance towards such marriages. In
the meantime, however, this reluctance to cross the domestic
threshhold exacerbates real difficulties of enforcement of the
law inside the home.
In summary, then, the law of Canada at present does not
recognize the crime of marital rape. There is a commitment
towards changing the law and removing the husband's
immunity. This is a positive step though one has to express
doubts as to what practical significance it will have. I believe
however, that it suffers from a graver weakness: namely, that
the law will be changed without any analysis of sex within
marriage and the extent to which the criminal law should be
used to deter and punish coercive sex within such an existing
relationship. I propose therefore, to offer some reflections on
how the law might be changed if a genuine attempt were to be
made to promote access by wives to whatever justice is on offer
by the criminal law of rape. If such an attempt is to be made
then we must recognize the special position and vulnerability of
wives and other women to coercion in relationships to which
they have committed themselves.
Since sexual intercourse is of course an ambiguous activity,
lack of consent has traditionally been seized upon as the essence
of the crime of rape. One must immediately add a further and
very severe limit on the scope of the criminal law: its relative
lack of ability to distinguish between such very complex
concepts as consensual and non-consensual sex. This does not
mean that the difference does not have to be thought through,
simply that the results of that thought must take the form of a
26 See Clark and Lewis, supra note 24, 55-57.
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fairly simple and easily applied legal distinction. The framers
of the present law of rape seem to have learnt that lesson all too
readily. It may be useful here to set out the relevant provision in
toto:
S. 143.A male person commits rape when he has sexual
intercourse with a female person who is not his wife.
(a) without her consent, or
(b) with her consent if the consent
(i)is extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm,
(ii)is obtained by personating her husband, or
(iii) is obtained by false and fraudulent representations as
to the nature and quality of the act.
This section is fairly typical of rape laws in that it does not
leave consent as a factual issue to be determined by the trier of
fact. Rather, it adds certain situations in which apparent
consent is legally vitiated, thereby at a single stroke utterly
confusing consent and submission. Thus, the question is not
'was her will overborne?' 27 but rather 'was her 'consent'
achieved by methods disapproved of by the law?' In other
words, the law maintains tight control over what factors vitiate
'consent' to intercourse in this context.
In order to take this discussion further, it is necessary to
present at least a working idea of what I mean by consent to
intercourse, recognizing that consent is a chameleon-like
concept. I realize that the following definition is not perfect,
but let me at least suggest that consent to sex is agreement based
entirely on certain factors relating to the two individuals
involved, factors such as pleasure, affection and the desire to
make the other person happy. It can only exist in situations
where the individual has a choice unfettered by external
factors. It hardly needs stating that such truly free consensual
intercourse must be very rare indeed.28 Yet anything else must
simply be the appearance of consent or, in other words,
submission since I do not think that any layperson would say
naturally that a woman with a gun to her head has consented to
intercourse, as our Criminal Code does, nor that a woman who
has had intercourse out of economic need has done anything
else than merely submit. However, our present law, having
27 For a discussion of this issue in the context of U.S. confession law, which
may provide a useful analogy, see Joseph D. Grano, "Voluntariness, Free
Will and the Law of Confessions" (1979), 65 Va. L.R. 859.
28 In writing this paper I gradually came to the realization that the only time
truly consensual intercourse may occur, is where the participants have
nothing to gain from one another, they enjoy material and legal equality
and have been raised in a totally non-sexist environment; that is, never. It
seems however, to be an ideal worth striving for, though having little to do
with the criminal law. My realization may however, have some impact at
the other end of the spectrum and make some small contribution to
creating an environment in which this ideal might be realized.
Vol. I
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labelled submission as consent, then limits the situations
severely in which such consent will be vitiated: basically to
force and fraud.
Perhaps only the unconscious or insane woman or the
woman who fights off her attacker throughout no matter what
the risk to herself can not be said to have consented when
consent is used to mean submission. There are probably a
number of reasons why rape laws have traditionally been
framed in such a way that submission is confused with consent
and then judgments are made that some things vitiate consent
and others do not. There are tremendous practical difficulties
in distinguishing between submission and consent on any given
set of facts so that there is an obvious attraction in confining
the law to submission - inducing factors which are readily
identifiable in a factual sense; hence, force and fraud. But
equally clearly, criminal law can be more sophisticated so that
this limiting of acceptable reasons for submitting to intercourse
must reflect some value judgment as, for example, that it is all
right to submit in order to avoid sufficiently serious personal
injury (and an objective test is used rather than the victim's
perception of the action) but that it is not all right to submit in
order to save one's job and that it is positively virtuous to
submit to your husband.
It does not seem too far-fetched to speculate that the
explanation may lie in the development of the law of rape as a
protection of a man's interest in his women: his wife, sister,
daughter, mother. What he feared most was the exercise of
physical force or that, gullible creatures that they were, women
might be tricked into intercourse. The women belonging to the
male framers of laws were not supposed to be working outside
the home in any event so should not need protection against
economic coercion. Certainly they did not need protection
against their husbands who could exercise more subtle forms of
power. Submission for reasons other than force or fraud also
involved behaviour on the part of the woman that was
unacceptable. Even today there is a significant risk that a
woman will simply not be believed in the absence of actual
injury.29
29 Clark and Lewis, supra note 24, conclude at 68, on the basis of their
empirical research, that the "greater the degree of violence the more likely
a jury is to believe that the victim did not consent to intercourse, and that
the commission of the crime placed her at serious risk."
These are all of course political judgments and one underlying theme of
this essay is the essentially political nature of rules which deny access.
(Denial of access here involves the refusal of law-makers to recognise
certain types of coercive sexual intercourse as criminal). As William
Conklin has stated in his "Clear Cases", Univ. of Tor. L.J. (forthcoming,
1981).
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It is clear that this confusion of consent and submission must
be addressed in any effort to improve the present law since, at a
minimum, the law must exclude true consensual intercourse
from its ambit. That is not a significant problem if one accepts
the view that such true consensual intercourse may rarely take
place in the sense of being uninfluenced by external factors such
as economic need or the conditioning of the sexes. No doubt in
a perfect world in which the sexes valued each other and
themselves equally such sexual activity would be much more
common but, at the moment, all acts of intercourse take place
in a wider context of economic inequality in which it is true to
say that men belong to a group that is dominant at various
levels. The main issue therefore does not relate to consent or the
absence of it, but rather to the types of submission which ought
to attract the attention of the criminal law. It is submitted by
this writer that the dividing line is not necessarily drawn in the
same place with marital rape as with other forms of rape since
there is the added factor of the marital relationship. In other
words, rules which define coercive sexual intercourse between
strangers may not be useful where there exists a close
relationship between victim and rapist. Here it may be
necessary for the law to recognize the effect of special pressures
arising out of the relationship. It is possible that a husband
might be appropriately labelled as a rapist where a stranger
would not.
The sense in which rules of law can be characterized as political in
clear cases is that there are justificatory ideas and conceptions which are
rooted in the rules. And, those ideas and conceptions are political
because they make statements about the distribution of power within
society. The distribution of power can be analyzed in terms of ideas
about the relationship or role between one decision-making structure
and another. Or, the rules of law can talk about the distribution of
power by assigning rights and duties, powers and immunities and the
like to certain categories of persons. Or, the rules affect the distribution
of power by specifying certain social practices or forms of conduct as
permissible whereas others are identified as proscribed.
There does not seem to be any significant change contained in Bill C-53,
First Sess., 32nd Parl.(Can.), 29 Eliz. II, 1980-81, s. 18. Although the new
s.244 (4) (a) states that it is a question of fact whether the complainant
consented or not, the effect of this may be vitiated by the new s.244(3)
which states as follows:
For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained where the
complainant submits or does not resist by reason of
(a) the application of force;
(b) threats or fear of the application of force;
(c) fraud; or
(d) the exercise of authority.
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At this point a diagram may be useful as a crude expository
device:
The necessary distinction has to be made between 3 and 2,
and the relevant inquiry is where the line should be drawn when
the rapist is the victim's husband.
In discussing this dividing line between submission to
criminal pressure and any other type of submission I am not
advocating any change in the law of mens rea but rather in
the actus reus of marital rape, although it is tempting to suggest
a move towards a type of strict liability.30 To the extent that
there is a collective male responsibility for the inferior and
relatively powerless position of women in our society, I incline
to the view that when a man has intercourse with a woman he is
taking an enormous risk that she is not consenting or perhaps,
more accurately, that she would not consent if she were an
autonomous human being enjoying a certain degree of self-
esteem and respect and, therefore, with no psychological or
30 Surprisingly enough, there is some judicial authority for this outside the
realm of intercourse with minors. See the dissenting judgment in Bresse v.
R. (1978), 7 C.R. (3d) 50 (Que. C.A.).
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economic need for male approval. As a group, men cannot
'have their cake and eat it too' - it is ludicrous to look for true
consent when our whole society is 'instinct with coercion'.'
However, at this point, I am not prepared to advocate a radical
enlargement of the traditional scope of the criminal law. At one
level at least, criminal law deals with personal guilt - it does
not normally operate to punish people on the basis of a
category to which they belong. At the moment there is no
collective male guilt for rape in the eyes of the criminal law.
The latter has no way, because it is not designed to, of reacting
to institutionalized coercion and thus redressing an imbalance
of power as far as any group is concerned.
I say "normally" because our criminal law does contain
some precedent for imposing a degree of liability on a group
basis. We do punish some people for exploiting their position in
a sexual context. An obscure example is the offence of
seduction of a female passenger by a ship's captain.3 2 A better
analogy is provided by the sexual offences involving people
below a certain age. While the argument is seriously put
forward that sexual activity between two young people should
not constitute a criminal offence, I think it is safe to say that
there is no pressure to change the law relating to sexual
intercourse between a girl and an older man.3 3 Because of the
relative weakness of the young as a group, in terms of their
physical strength, economic position, and psychological
development, adults as a group engage in sexual activity with
them at their peril. It matters not where the child is under
fourteen years of age whether in any particular case she was in
3 ' There may be an analogy here to the concern about confessions obtained in
the coercive setting of a police station, even though there is no active
coercion other than the setting itself.
32 The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34, s.154. Note that the question is a
factual one of whether the passenger was seduced. Presumably the
difference between this offence and rape is that the ship's captain is in a
position of power. An example which is more topical is the offence
contained in s.153(b) of intercourse with a female employee under the age
of twenty-one.
31 See generally Hogan, "On Modernising the Law of Sexual Offences" in
P.R. Glazebrook, ed., Reshaping the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of
Glanville Williams (London: Stevens, 1978), 180: "Generally speaking and
quite rightly, the law protects the young against exploitation". The relevant
sections of The Criminal Code are 146 and 151. The Canada Law Reform
Commission, supra note 6, has recommended, at 19, the retention of the
prohibition as to age and also that there be a new offence of sexual
interference due to.dependency, at 22.
Every one who, for a sexual purpose, directly or indirectly touches a
person fourteen years of age or older but under eighteen years of age,
whose consent was obtained by the exercise of authority or the
exploitation of dependency is guilty of an indictable offence and liable
to imprisonment for five years.
Sed quaere the limitation to young persons? See also Bill C-53.
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fact the stronger, more aggressive party.3" Sex may be an even
more significant difference than age. The relative weakness of
women in our society is easily documented.35 Age as a rational
way of identifying a group in need of special protection only
has the patina of age itself to commend it.
I am not suggesting in using this analogy that women are like
children.3 6 I am merely suggesting that many choices made by
women today might not be made in a different type of society.
However, the analogy has the virtue, I hope, of being thought-
provoking and of underscoring the view that intercourse
between a member of a relatively powerful group with a
member of a relatively powerless group is essentially
questionable. The basic thesis of this essay is that, given the
position of inequality of Canadian (and other) women, one
should start with the assumption that such intercourse is non-
consensual and look for evidence of consent, rather than the
reverse.
A furi ier and similar analogy can be found in the law of
incest. Professor Hogan presents the following argument in
favour of retaining the crime: 3 7
The problem arises where the father exploits his authority as
father without overtly intimidating the daughter so that proof of
some other offence would be difficult to make out. Such cases,
no doubt, occur where the daughter's consent is no more than
submission.
This helps to focus more directly on the issue explored in this
paper: the access of married women to the full scope of the
criminal justice system. A great deal of what I have said so far
relates generally to sexual relations between men and women.
The marital relationship, rather than negating the possibility of
coercive sex, presents opportunities for types of pressure other
than those asserted by rapists other than husbands.
3 See s.146(l), cf. s.146(2) and (3) which relate to children between the ages
of 14 and 16.
3 See, e.g. the Report by the National Council of Welfare, Women and
Poverty (Ottawa: The Council, 1979). The stark conclusion is reached at
51, that "[m]ost Canadian women become poor at some point in their lives.
Their poverty is rarely the result of controllable circumstances, and it is
seldom the outcome of extraordinary misfortune. In most cases, women
are poor because poverty is a natural consequence of the role they are still
expected to play in our society."
36 No doubt it may be said that I am suggesting that women have no minds of
their own, and that drawing an analogy between women and children has
been a common device used against women. I wish to make it clear that I
believe that, in most cases, the decision to submit to unwanted sexual
intercourse is precisely that, a decision, and the issue relates to the
appropriate role of the criminal law in protecting women from pressure.
37 In Reshaping the Criminal Law, supra note 33, 189. Bill C-53, First Sess.,
32nd Parl. (Can.), 29 Eliz II, 1980-81, retains incest as a crime.
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All of this merely reiterates that we cannot assume that
intercourse, especially marital intercourse, is normally
consensual and that the criminal law must only deal with the
rare aberration. It seems more realistic to assume that people
engage in sexual activity because of diverse kinds of pressures:
internal and external, conscious and unconscious. The issue
here is 'when should these pressures justify intervention by the
criminal law, bearing in mind that criminal law tends, on the
whole, to focus on personal rather than group guilt?'
Therefore, gaining access to the criminal law may be actively
dysfunctional for any feminist concern such as sexual abuse by
husbands in that it tends to depoliticize the issue and to reduce
it to an interpersonal problem. The criminal law does not help
with an analysis which would lead us to doubt our institutions
and the present structure of society38 (Nor indeed, does writing
about access to justice generally do so.)
In thinking about what should go into circle 3, the proper
domain of the criminal law, it may be helpful to utilize a
traditional analysis of criminal offences. It is submitted that
rape can be broken down into two elements:
(1) intercourse submitted to by the victim because of
pressure brought to bear or exploited by the rapist;
(2) mens rea.
Initially it must be stressed with respect to the first element
that no judgment of the victim can be justified so that whatever
concept we use should not permit such a judgment, as does our
present law which treats a rape victim rather like a prisoner-of-
war who gives information under torture. We make a moral
judgment as to whether the pain or threat of it justified the
disclosure. There is no apparent reason why the statement that
the victim of rape submitted to pressure should include any
moral judgment. Another way of describing what happens is to
say that the victim is coerced into sexual activity and that the
descriptive use of the word coercion does not necessarily entail
a normative judgment of either party involved. (For the alleged
rapist the normative judgment is made at the second, mens rea
stage, so that there is no need for concern about casting the net
of submission rather widely.) It is entirely plausible to say that
a police officer coerced someone without making any judgment
of the police officer or of the person coerced. Thus it is with
rape: the initial factual question is whether the victim submitted
to pressure.
Gerald Dworkin, in his article "Compulsion and Moral
Concepts"" argues that the existence of coercion is a purely
factual issue - after that comes the question of moral
38 Indeed, to further that aim, it may well be better to leave the marital
immunity in place.
'9 (1968), 78 Ethics 227.
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responsibility which, with the rape victim, would never arise
and, with the rapist, would revolve around mens rea issues.
Dworkin says that "coercion remains a descriptive and
explanatory category with no logical ties to responsibility or the
absence of it." 40 Thus the act of rape should be a fact like any
other to be decided on the basis of whether the victim was
deprived of freedom to make a choice based simply on the
experience of sex itself and the attraction of the male.4" I do not
mean that she is deprived of free will - that would be a red
herring and would, in any event, lead the criminal law into
issues with which it is not capable of dealing. An example may
be helpful. An employer indicates to an employee that if she
does not have intercourse with him he will fire her. She decides
to have intercourse with him because she is afraid of losing her
job. It makes sense to say that she was coerced into having
sexual intercourse, but certainly not that she was deprived of
her free will. She exercised it to submit to what was, in her
view, the least of two evils.42 This avoids the difficulty pointed
out by Atiyah in his recent book, The Rise and Fall of Freedom
of Contract.43 He states, in discussing duress, that
the tendency to treat coercion as something affecting the free
will, was unfortunate. The idea that a man's will is 'overborne'
by certain types of pressure and not by others is, both in logic
indefensible, and in practice impossible of application. The
reality is that some forms of pressure are in conformity with the
... moral ideas of the community, and others are not. 44
It is the main thrust of this essay that it is time that the 'moral
ideas' of our community, as reflected in the criminal law,
reflect the idea that any pressure to engage in sexual intercourse
is unacceptable. Once the presence of the coercive factor in a
fact situation is established, then this would provide the basis
only for an inquiry into the personal guilt of the male. By itself
it would hardly be sufficient because a woman can be subjected
to pressure (whether to submit to that pressure would depend
on the individual woman) from external factors such as the
economic situation of herself and/or her children, the
psychological need for male approval which is constantly
reinforced by the media, the perception that children need a
father, or the perception of the need to maintain the male ego
40 Id., 232.
4, This is not a new idea. See the very useful article on consent as a factual
issue by Jocelynne A. Scutt, "The Standard of Consent in Rape", [19761
N.Z.L.J. 462.
42 And indeed the male in this case would already be committing an offence
under s. 153(1) (b) of The Criminal Code, if the woman were under twenty-
one. Presumably all other women are under a duty to be made of sterner
stuff.
43 (1979).
4 4 Id., 436.
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so that he remains a good provider, father and agreeable
companion. The male cannot, according to traditional theories
of criminal responsibility, be punished for such pressure unless
he consciously exploits it."'
In considering submission to pressure to engage in sexual
activity, it is necessary to cut away inappropriate analogies
which cloud the issue because of common consent terminology
and because judgment of the victim is inappropriate. At the
moment a rape victim is treated rather like a person who
commits a crime under duress, in that a judgment is reached as
to her reason for submission. We might think that the
contractual concept of duress is more appropriate and so,
indeed, it is because we are dealing with an agreement to have
sex, and not a commission of some wrong by the victim. Yet it
is dangerous to use contract law as a model. The difference is
fundamental in that with contracts there is a bargain which can
be judged objectively. Although similar questions have to be
asked about contracts between parties of unequal bargaining
power (for example, 'did the weaker party consent?') we can
afford to have a very narrow concept of lack of consent as it is
still possible to judge the bargain. Thus we can enter into
contracts with monopolies because it is possible to say that
power was used fairly and for a socially-desirable economic
purpose.
At one and the same time we can respect the judgment of the
weaker party since, no matter how weak an individual is, it is
assumed that he or she can still weigh alternatives in at least
some theoretical sense. But we can refuse to enforce the
contract because of the abuse of power as evidenced by the
terms of the bargain itself.6 There is no such bargain element
to be judged in sexual relations. We cannot say, to give the
most simplistic example, that on the one hand the wife has to
have sexual intercourse when she does not want to but, on the
other, her husband keeps a roof over her head and is otherwise
kind to her. This is reducing marital sex to prostitution.
For the same reason there is no analogy to international
treaties, although the possibility was appealing initially since
in many ways the United States and Canada, for example, are
like husband and wife. We are physically close, there are
obvious differences in size and power including economic
45 This is a conservative position. At some point, it must become legitimate to
expect a degree of consciousness from men. It may indeed be already the
time to utilize the concept of wilful blindness in this context. For a highly
persuasive argument that rape can be analyzed as a crime of negligence,
which certainly jolted me out of my "subjective orthodoxy" see Toni
Packard, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea To the
Crime" (1980), 30 U. of T. L. J. 75.
46 The courts are becoming increasingly willing to judge bargains, using the
concept of unconscionability. See S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts
(Agincourt: Canada Law Books, 1977), 266-340.
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power, and there is a certain identity of interest - perhaps too
close for the taste of Canadians. An agreement, for example,
relating to the extraction of Canadian mineral resources might
be subject to the same concern as sexual intercourse between
husband and wife: the total situation of inequality and
economic dependence prevents a completely free choice. But
nevertheless, such an agreement can be scrutinized and judged
objectively while a sexual relationship cannot. Whatever infant
theory of unequal agreements is developing in international
law, 7 it is not of much use to us here conceptually although the
same concern is evident that weakness should not be exploited
and the same point can be made that the law is simplistic in the
extreme. A treaty might be invalid because it was forced upon a
Czech Ambassador by Hitler, but no serious attempt has been
made to analyze treaties in terms of the respective power of the
parties although in practice an unfair treaty will tend to be
discarded as soon as it is feasible.
Another analogy which might seem helpful at first relates to
the issues surrounding consent to drug programmes as, for
example, in the prison setting. It can be plausibly argued that
the very fact of institutionalization casts doubt on such
'consent'. 8 It seems that here there is something useful which
helps to explain at least partly why consent by a wife should be
subject to scrutiny, particularly a woman who undertakes the
traditional role of wife and mother. It is worth considering
whether she is in a 'total institution' in a sense, economically
and possibly psychologically dependent on her husband, a
dependence which is reinforced by society as a whole. But even
here there is the crucial difference that we can develop
standards to judge the morality of the bargain especially in view
of the fact that we do not want to deny the prisoner the right to
bargain for his or her freedom.
A better analogy may well be found in the jurisprudence
relating to consent to medical treatment. Here the case-law on
informed consent has demonstrated an attempt to impose a
duty upon the physician to facilitate self-determination by the
patient. 9 However, the imposition of a duty on a husband to
ensure free choice by the wife seems to go too far for the
criminal law even if it were possible in our present society.
Hence the suggested utilization of the traditional concept of
mens rea to help isolate cases of pressure on a wife for which a
husband is personally responsible.
49 See T. David Marshall, The Physician and Canadian Law (2nd ed.,
Toronto: Carswell, 1979), 33 ff.
47 See Wolfgang Friedmann, Oliver J. Lissitzyn & Richard C. Pugh, Cases
and Materials on International Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub. Co.,
1969), 334 ff.
48 There is some authority for this in Michigan for example. See Jeffrie
Murphy, "Total Institutions and the Possibility of Consent to Organic
Therapies" (1975), 5 Human Rights 25.
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Before going on to that second element, however, it seems
necessary to utilize a further traditional concept: that of
causation. There would have to be a link between the pressure
brought to bear by the husband and the submission. This
is where any proposal such as this comes closest to the
danger of facilitating perpetuation of the present system since
naturally a judgment will have to be made as to this causative
link.50
Consequently, in realistic terms, what is likely to be
recognized as effective pressure by people charged with making
such determinations? There are obvious factors such as force,
although here we need to develop a sensitivity to the fact that a
situation can be instinct with the threat of force although no
threat is actually uttered. That depends on the marital history.
American courts have shown some willingness to accept this
type of argument. For example, in People v. Flores" it was
stated that:
If one were met in a lonely place by four big men and told to
hold up his hands or do anything else, he would be doing the
reasonable thing if he obeyed, even if they did not say what they
would do to him if he refused. Their action and manner might
well indicate their purpose and intention and it would be a mere
play on words to say that these actions and circumstances did
not constitute and were not the expression of a threat. In fact it
would be a very compelling one.
The same degree of willingness to accept the 'four big men'
argument has not been shown in the context of rape, and one
would naturally not be sanguine about marital rape. In general
a threat must be expressed and the victim must risk it being
carried out before she will be believed. (In one older English
case which provides an ironic contrast to Flores, R. v. Hallett, 52
the victim was attacked by eight men but did not resist after the
initial attack so that they were convicted of assault only.)
Force is an obvious type of pressure. The other possibilities
are infinite and examples only should be given legislatively,
threats to children, threats relating to money, food, precious
and loved objects and even social activities. Limiting the
possibilities would simply provide a vehicle for the judgment of
the victim. The trier of fact must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt, which makes the current limitations
on the law seem somewhat superfluous. Thus, to take an
extreme case, it would simply not be credible that a woman
would submit to unwanted intercourse because her husband
threatened not to take her out to dinner. But would it not be
o I am not at all rejecting the argument that simply bringing pressure to bear
on a woman should be a criminal offence, whether or not the woman
submits. There is scope for both crimes of rape and sexual harassment.
5' 62 Cal. App. 2d. 700, 145 P. 2d. 318, 320 (1944).
"(1841), 9 Car. & P. 748, 173 E. R. 1036.
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credible if he threatened to burn the only copy of her Ph.D.
Thesis or, more difficult from past experience, if she knew that
family life would be intolerable until he had his own way?
Once a finding of coercion is made, then the inquiry as to the
second element would be whether the husband deliberately or
recklessly introduced the pressure into the fact situation. That
is based simply on the application of the normal principles of
mens rea. In addition, however, mental guilt could be based on
the conscious exploitation of external factors. We cannot in
some cases judge personal guilt without looking at such factors.
A useful analogy can be found in Frankfurts' discussion of
the difference between an offer and a threat in his essay on
"Coercion and Moral Responsibility"." He gives the example
of the butcher who raises the price of meat. We might not feel
that that is coercive in a normative sense since it is a simple
change in his or her offer to sell us meat. But we need to look at
the external circumstances. If we suppose that the customer will
starve otherwise and the price is outrageously high, then the
butcher can be judged accordingly. Indeed there are criminal
law precedents for so doing. Three conditions are necessary:
1. Customer is dependent on butcher for meat.
2. Customer needs meat.
3. Butcher exploits customer's dependency and need.
Therefore it is possible for the relationship between the butcher
and the customer to provide the foundation for a coercive
situation, even though the customer's need is caused by factors
for which the butcher is not personally responsible.
Traces can be found in case law of the idea that the coercive
element can come from a position of power. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Carpenter," a case of indecent assault, a
policeman picked up a girl under sixteen for violation of curfew
and assaulted her sexually. It was argued for the defence that
she consented and the policeman testified that she did not
protest. It was held that the jury could conclude a lack of
consent. She submitted because the circumstances meant that
there was no need for force. The defendent's position, together
with the threat (unstated) of detention for violation of the
curfew, interfered with the freedom of choice of the girl. Two
factors were therefore significant: first, the defendant's
position of power which he exploited and, secondly, the fact of
submission although there was no actual threat of force.
In my view it should not matter whether the victim took the
decision to submit or whether it simply did not occur to her that
she had any choice in the circumstances. But I do recognize that
my proposal above suffers from the grave weakness that it
5 In Ted Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action, (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973).
54 172 Pa. Super. 271, 94 A 2d. 74 (1953).
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offers nothing for the wives who have been socialized into the
belief that they are the sexual property of their husbands. A
domestic relationship may be such that a woman's will is
effectively paralyzed in the sense that she either is not able to
act on her wishes or is not able to choose what she wants. 5
However, one can only hope that the abolition of the marital
exception and discussion of what should take its place may
have some small impact on this problem.
I am sure that what I have offered here is an imperfect
contribution to that debate. My aim, however, is to urge that it
is not sufficient to recognize simply that the legal immunity of
husbands is unacceptable and hence to bring the law of marital
rape into line with the rest of the law without some discussion
of the special coercive potential of the marital context. It is
submitted that any change in the law should reflect the view
that any pressure to engage in sexual activity is unacceptable so
that we can move away from the ingrained notion of the
victim's responsibility. It is also submitted that the nature of
sexual activity in the context of an established relationship
between a member of a relatively powerless group with a
member of a relatively powerful group should be subjected to
special scrutiny. We should also consider the possibility of
adapting the conventional concept of mens rea to focus on
conscious exploitation of collective power. I hope that I have at
least stimulated some reflection on the difficulties of free sexual
interaction between men and women, especially in the context
of an established relationship.
55I have taken the concept of control over one's wants from Harry G.
Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" (1971), 68
Journal of Philosophy 5. One of the basic thrusts of active feminism is
that women can help each other stop wanting certain things such as male
approval simply because it is male, or male companionship rather than
female companionship. It hardly seems necessary to state, except for the
fact that feminist writing is sometimes criticized for not exhaustively
cataloging men's woes, that men too can be trapped in an unhappy
marriage, and can indeed perceive themselves to be relatively powerless
vis-a-vis their wives.
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